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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
OF THE NLRB
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOARD
S A RESULT of the enactment of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act,' the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
has undergone changes in its organizational structure and pro-
cedures. The membership of the Board has been increased from
three to five. Three members constitute a quorum at all times. The
Board may delegate any of its powers to any group of three, and
when this occurs, a quorum consists of two members.
The General Counsel of the Board is appointed by the President
by and with the consent of the Senate. He has general supervision
over all attorneys employed by the Board (other than trial exam-
iners and legal assistants to Board members) and over officers and
employees in the regional offices. He has "final authority, on be-
half of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and
issuance of complaints... and in respect of the prosecution of
such complaints before the Board... " The Board, however, has
the primary responsibility for handling representation cases and
union-shop authorization elections under Section 9 of the Act.
Because the General Counsel has general supervision over officers
and employees in the regional offices who process the representa-
tion and union-shop authorization cases, there is an apparent over-
lapping of authority.
The mtin functions of the Board are to act in the capacity of
a rule-making body and to decide cases upon formal records.
Before the Taft-Hartley Law was passed, the Board established
a Review Division to aid in its adjudicating function. The division
analyzed records, reported cases to the Board and drafted opinions.
The Review Division was eliminated by language in Section 4 (a)
of the Act:
161 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. III, §§ 141-197. The principal
changes in structure are to be found in §§ 3 and 4.
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"The Board may not employ any attorneys for the purpose of re-
viewing transcripts of hearings or preparing drafts of opinions except
that any. attorney employed for assignment as a legal assistant to
any Board member may for such Board member review such tran-
scripts and prepare such drafts."
Thus, the burden of reviewing records and writing decisions is
definitely placed upon the Board members.
The Congress was intent upon insuring that the adjudicating
function should not be combined or associated with the prosecut-
ing function. The trial examiner's report cannot be reviewed by
any person "other than a member of the Board or his legal assist-
ant, and no trial examiner ... [may] advise or consult with the
Board with respect to exceptions taken to his findings, rulings or
recommendations."
The General Counsel of the NLRB has final authority to decide
whether or not a complaint should issue on a charge of unfair
labor practice. But it appears that whether or not the Board will
take jurisdiction and issue an order is for the Board ultimately
to decide.2
The Office of the General Counsel has been organized into four
divisions. The Division of Law is the legal department. The Divi-
sion of Operations supervises the various regional offices. Review
of dismissals of complaints and recommendation of general policy
measures are done in the Division of Policies and Appeals. The
Division of Administration deals with fiscal matters, prepares sta-
tistical reports and handles personnel matters.
PETITION FOR ELECTION
Representation proceedings may now be instituted (1) by peti-
tion of employees or a labor representative or organization alleg-
ing that a substantial number of employees wish to be represented
for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recog-
nize their representative as the majority choice; (2) by petition
2 Haleston Drug Stores v. N. L. R. B., 187 F. 2d 418- (9th Cir. 1951).
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of employees or a labor organization asserting that the presently
recognized or certified representative is no longer the majority
choice; or (3) by petition of the employer alleging that one or
more individuals or labor organizations make claim to be recog-
nized as the collective bargaining representative.3 The first type
of petition was provided for under the original Wagner Act
(NLRA). The second type petition is new and leads to "decer-
tification." The third type enlarges the right of employers to com-
mence representation proceedings. The Rules and Regulations of
the NLRB just prior to passage of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act permitted an employer to file a petition only where two
or more unions were making conflicting claims to rights of repre-
sentation.4
Before the Board may proceed with any of these petitions, it
must have "reasonable cause to believe that a question of repre-
sentation affecting commerce exists." (Italics added.) If no union
claims to represent a majority of the employees, no question of
representation exists, and the Board must dismiss the petition.5
Disclaimer of majority standing eliminates a fact essential to the
jurisdiction of the Board. The Board has said that where disclaimer
is made, continuation of the proceedings would ordinarily be a
waste of time and effort. Further, if an election were held, under
Section 9 (c) (3) no subsequent election could be held for twelve
months.
The hearing of a representation proceeding is conducted by an
officer or employee in the appropriate regional office, and he trans-
mits the record to the NLRB without recommendations. The Board
then decides on the record whether a question of representation
3 § 9(c).
4 Matter of Kraft Foods Company, 83 N. L. R. B. 331 (1949) ; Matter of Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Walla Walla, Washington, 80 N. L. R. B. 1063 (1948).
5 Matter of Griffin Hosiery Mills, Inc., d/b/a Dove Down Hosiery Mills, 83 N. L.
R. B. 1240 (1949) ; Matter of Merchants Fire Dispatch, 83 N. L. R. B. 788 (1949) ;
Matter of Murray B. Marsh Company, Inc., 79 N. L. R. B. 76 (1948) ; Matter of Fed-
eral Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, 77 N. L. R. B. 463 (1948) ; Matter of Tabard-
rey Manufacturing Company, 51 N. L. R. B. 246 (1943).
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exists, and if such question exists, an election by secret ballot must
be directed. Eliminated is the former practice whereby a regional
director could order an election after investigating a petition for
certification. Election by secret ballot was uniformly used by the
NLRB before enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, but it was not
mandatory under the Wagner Act.
The NLRB continues reluctant to settle a dispute concerning
representation between two (or more) unions affiliated with the
same parent organization. But if the dispute cannot be resolved by
the parent organization, the Board will settle the issue.'
Section 9 (c) (3) prohibits an election in any bargaining unit
or subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period,
a valid election has been held. This has introduced an inflexible
feature into the practice of the Board, which was commented upon
in Matter of Western Electric Company.' In this case the Board
ordered an election, realizing that it could not provide for another
election six months after certification, as had been its practice
where the number of employees in the unit was increasing at a
rapid rate.
Section 9 (c) (3) declares that "employees on strike who are
not entitled to reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote." Thus,
employees who have taken part in an "economic" strike and who
have been permanently replaced are not eligible to vote. Under
the Wagner Act the Board allowed "economic" strikers to vote
even though they had been replaced because of the broad defini-
tion of "employee" as "any individual whose work has ceased as
a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dis-
pute."' Of course, strikers because of unfair labor practices re-
main eligible to vote.
The majority rule continues to prevail in elections under Sec-
6 Matter of Gerity Michigan Corporation, 78 N. L. R. B. 94 (1948); Matter of
Pacific Car and Foundry Company, 76 N. L. R. B. 32 (1948).
7 76 N. L. R. B. 400 (1948).
8 Matter of Columbia Pictures Corp., 64 N. L. R. B. 490 (1945) ; Matter of The
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32 N. L. R. B. 163 (1941) ; Matter of A. Sartorious and Co.,
Inc., 10 N. L. R. B. 493 (1938).
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tion 9 (c).' Where none of the choices on the first ballot receives
a majority, a run-off is conducted, "the ballot providing for a se-
lection between the two choices receiving the largest and second
largest number of valid votes cast in the election." The NLRB
under the Wagner Act had at various times different practices in
conducting run-offs. Immediately before the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Law, the practice was to eliminate the "neither" or "none"
choice from the ballot unless it received a plurality of votes.' 0 It
would seem that the practice now compelled is uniform regardless
of what the first two choices are and is in harmony with the state-
ment in Section 7 that employees should have the right to refrain
from organizational activity if they choose.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Section 10 (b) empowers the Board or its agent to issue com-
plaints for unfair labor practices and has the provision "that no
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occur-
ring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against
whom such charge is made . . . ." No period of limitation was
stated in the original National Labor Relations Act, and it has
been held that the proviso has no application to complaints issued
before the effective date (August 22, 1947) of the amendments to
the Act."
With respect to charges filed within six months after the effec-
tive date of the Act, it was held that complaints would issue there-
on regardless of the date of occurrence of the alleged unfair labor
practices. 2 In this way the NLRB avoided giving the limitation
9 Matter of United States Rubber Co., 83 N. L. R. B. 378 (1949) ; Matter of Best
Motor Lines, 82 N. L. R. B. 269 (1949).
10 See N. L. R. B. Rules and Regulations, Series 4 (effective September 11, 1946),
§ 203.56.
11 Matter of Briggs Manufacturing Company, 75 N. L. R. B. 569 (1947); Matter of
Detroit Gasket and Mfg. Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 670 (1948).
12 Matter of Augusta Chemical Company, 83 N. L. R. B. 53 (1949); Matter of
Shawnee Milling Co., 82 N. L. R. B. 1266 (1949) ; Matter of Old Colony Box Company,
81 N. L. R. B. 1025 (1949) Mat:er of Itasca Cotton Manufacturing Company, 79 N. L.
R. B. 1442 (1948).
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proviso retroactive effect beyond the date of its effectiveness. With
respect to an unfair labor practice occurring since August 22,
1947, the proviso precludes issuance of a complaint if a charge
has not been filed and served within six months after the occur-
rence of the unfair labor practice.
COMPETENCY OF EVIDENCE
Section 10 (b) of the original National Labor Relations Act
stated that in a complaint proceeding before the NLRB "the rules
of evidence in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling."
This statement is omitted from the Taft-Hartley Act, and Section
10 (b) declares that any complaint proceeding "shall, so far as
practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence
applicable in the district courts of the United States under the
rules of civil procedure for the district courts... adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States ...... What the phrase "so far
as practicable" means is not clear, and decisions have not yet
come down explaining it.
The phrase is probably a compromise between the view that the
Board should consider only "legal" evidence and the view that
the Board should have discretion to consider any evidence that is
relevant and reasonably reliable. 3 Unquestionably a restriction
has been placed upon the NLRB, and, in general, it may only con-
sider evidence which is competent in the federal district courts.
The restriction arose because of the criticism that the Board was
giving weight to hearsay and other unreliable evidence. It is to
be noted that Section 7 (c) of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 4 says that "any oral or documentary evidence may
be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide
for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious
evidence...." As far as the NLRB is concerned, this section must
' See WOLLET, LABOR RELATIONS AND FEDERAL LAW (1948) 15, and MILLIS AND
BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY (1950) 73.
14 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1006.
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be regarded as superseded by Section 10 (b) of the Taft-Hartley
Law.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The Wagner Act stated that the findings of the Board as to the
facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. This wording
has been changed under the Taft-Hartley Law to read that if the
findings of the Board are supported by "substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole," then such findings shall be
conclusive. In the recent case of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 5
the standard of proof required of the Board was set out as being
the same as that required by the courts in reviewing an adminis-
trative action subject to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
There has been a feeling of dissatisfaction with the decisions of
the judiciary that have been handed down under the Wagner Act.
This feeling was engendered by the belief that any "substantial"
evidence whatsoever in the record to support a finding would
bring about an affirmance of the Board.
Following Congressional intent in the amended act, the review-
ing tribunal must take into consideration the "whole" record to
determine whether the evidence is or is not substantial. The court
of appeals must be satisfied that the order of the Board rests upon
adequate proof. This is not to say that the findings of the Board
are not entitled to respect; but such findings must be set aside
when an examination of the record discloses that the evidence is
insubstantial when viewed in the reading of the record as a whole.
In the companion case of NLRB v. Pittsburgh S. S. Company6
the question arose as to the proper scope of review by the Supreme
Court in reference to the conclusion reached by the court of ap-
peals. It was decided that the limit of review by the Supreme Court
in such instances was merely to determine the fairness of the ex-
amination and evaluation of the record by the court of appeals.
15 340 U. S. 474 (1951).
16 340 U. S. 498 (1951).
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